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The paper examines several abstractions of the construct 
of. 1 economic man' in sccio-economic theory and indicates 
ius ineptitude for our understanding of social formations 
having no clarified experience of what bourgeois ideology 
conceives as civil society„ Two main issues of 'misplaced 
concieteness1 are mixed up with the centrality of 'economic 
man1„ Primarily, there occurs the fallacy ^f composing the 
so-called rational self-interest of atomised individuals 
as the organising principle of society. Further, the 
reality of historical change is multi-linear and the 
experience confirms no homogenization of the social-existence 
forms of labour through the universal movement of capital. 
The paper cites examples from the literature on Indian 
planning and development to illustrate the problem. 
The Limits of 'Economic Man' 
Asik Sen 
This paper is concerned with a critical problem of 
understanding social f4rmations which have no clear historical 
experience of what bourgeois ideology conceives as civil 
society along with its protagonist of 'economic man'. In 
pre-capitalist structures, and also, to various extent, in 
historical circumstances which combine the domination of 
capital with economic and socio-cultural survivals of pre-
capitalism, no idea of a contractual civil society prevails 
among vast majorities of the people. Thus, social sciences 
have to face the task of interpreting structures, ideologies 
and cultures which cannot be reduced to the pursuit of rational 
self-interest as the constructive principle of common human 
living. 
* 
Marx's critique of political economy implied a critique 
•f 'economic man', of the ideology that treats economic incum-
bencies in isolation from the larger social process. Further, 
the reality of classes and class struggle emphasizes the 
formation of collective bonds which deny the supposed synthesis 5 -r V 
of atomistic self-interest and social totality. The phenomenon 
of collective consciousness signifies the key role of Marx's 
'class for itself. While class interests are to be defended, 
class struggle raises the battle of interests to the level of 
political struggle for a collective alternative. There lies 
the critical difference between an aggregate expression of 
merely economic interests and a 'class for itself' becoming 
the force of historical change on the strength of its collec-
tive consciousness. 
2 
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Much of Marx's analysis was elaborated in immediate 
reference to Europe's experience mf capitalist transformation 
and its consequences. It was largely a view of society from 
the historical perspective of capitalism and its supersession 
by proletarian revolution. Notwithstanding Marx's caution to 
the contrary, some of his key formulations were mistaken as a 
timetable laying out a determinate linear sequence of feuda-
lism — capitalism — socialism,for all countries of the world. 
Correlatively, the full purport of Marx's critique has often 
been lost in an overemphasis on economic relations alone and 
some extreme concern for the techno-economic thrust of capita-
lism to prepare the material conditions for socialist * 
transition. 
The dynamic role of capital accumulation has its 
necessary place in Marx's analysis of historical transformation. 
On being aligned to the idea of successive stages of history, 
the same role projects the capacity of capital for assimilating 
the social subjects to a universal capital-labour nexus. In a 
sense, capital is supposed to homogenise the forms «f labour's 
social-existence. Such a homogeneity postulate coupled with 
the idea of'capital's universality has analytical effects akin 
to what the construct of 'economic man' builds into the*. * 
relation between rational individual choice, competitive 
markets, accumulation and economic growth. 
Let me immediately add that linking some aspects of the 
law of motion of capital to what the construct of 'economic man' 
supposedly articulates for the course of history in no way 
diminishes the distinct validity of Marx's interpretation of 
capitalism and its contradictions. On the contrary, it would 
help us in understanding the peculiarities of capital's 
expansion through the experience of imperialism and its 
aftermath. The common experience of duality in the contemporary 
third world is replete with the phenomenon of hybrid structures. 
Wallerstein1s 'world system' or his paradigm of 'the great 
expansion' is restricted to how the core of capitalism can look 
upon a periphery as merely the space of its exploits and 
extraction. It has little use for the periphery's self-
description and understanding. Both in relation to their home 
and the world, the vast multitude of those countries are reduced 
to a marginality which is virtually an ever-lasting position for 
the numerous. For them, no role of 'economic man1 is tenable, 
nor does capital dynamics hold out any potential for their 
clarified absorption in the bourgeois order of things. 
At this point an historic reality emerges complicating 
the issues which are to be considered by economists for their 
understanding and analysis of the problem of development. No 
interpretation of human social action is adequate in 
terms of a utility and a profit function. Further, the logic 
of capital's expansion cannot reach far enough to eliminate all 
tics of pre-capital among the vast multitude. There is little 
meaning in explaining such realities as traditional and non-
rational. Indeed, the whole question of interaction and 
compatibility between the economic and the non-economic shall 
then seek answers which would require significant conflation of 
areas customarily assigned to different social science discipli-
nes . It is then not enough to deal with contradictions in 
reality. We have to take full account of contradictions in our 
very concepts of reality. Let us then consider some examples 
from the Indian planning and development literature to illus-
trate the problem. This should also enable us to trace the 
bearing of the discipline's own tradition on such characteristic 
issues. 
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While admitting the need for structural changes to 
break the vicious circle of low production, low incomes and 
meagre capital formation,, The Economics of Industrialization 
maintained a tone of cautious realism. It also focused on 
the question of political choices in securing substantial and 
quick development. Particularly significant was Professor 
Datta's concern at the apparent incompatibility between the 
ends and the means of any strategy of economic development s 
•Quick development, domestic financing, parliamentary democracy 
and income equality are all desirable ends and it would be good 
to have them all together. But it is almost impossible to 
achieve all this at the same time. One can easily show that 
any three of these desirable ends can perhaps be secured 
2 together, by..t not all the four1 . 
The question of choices marked a critical point where 
an economic policy was required to justify itself in terms of 
its wider socio-political implications. On purely economic 
grounds, the issue was undecidable because no decision of this 
kind could escape the social, politico-economic and cultural 
obligations of its practice; yet these would conventionally 
remain outside the scope of the analytical apparatus on which 
the policy was based. Professor Datta's book respected its own 
disciplinary boundaries in' analysing the cyclical, seasonal and 
structural problems of under-employment vis-a-vis the prospects 
and difficulties of industrialization in underdeveloped countries. 
Nevertheless, the passage in question, coming as it did in the 
book's epilogue, signified a need to transgress those boundaries. 
The point is strengthened in the light of India's 
planning experience since the mid-1950s. Take, for example, 
the priority on heavy industries in the Second Five Year Plan. 
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The decision itself was sought to be justified in consideration 
of the country's resource endowments and the need to remove some 
of the fundamental constraints of the political economy of 
backwardness. But the planning exercise, both in its conception 
and its practice, betrayed a miserable failure to take adequate 
account of the structural implications of the projected growth 
pattern in the Indian economy. 
In its identification of the emphasis on heavy indus-
3 
tries with the very 'impetus of planning', the Second Flan 
minimized the importance of all institutional factors which 
were to act as severe constraints on the planning process. The 
default was most glaring in the agrarian sector. This had 
far-reaching effects on the goals and strategy of growth in the 
subsequent plans. Further, there was a serious failure in 
resource mobilization for achieving the plan targets. The 
sectoral imbalances of output composition were already evident 
in the working of the Second Plan. Such maladjustments became 
cumulatively more critical through the following decades. Thus, 
'Considering the entire national economy, our long experience 
of quasi-stagnation for nearly two decades can be shown to have 
its roots in the pattern of more rapid industrialization during 
the Second Plan. The policy import substitution and the 
priority assigned to the heavy and intermediate goods sector 
accelerated the pace of industrialization. But this was achieved 
with no structural changes to broaden the potential for mass 
consumption demand. No wonder the national rates of industrial 
growth had to slow down soon, while large increases took place 
in the output of a wide variety of luxury consumer goods. The 
so-called "socialist" rationale of the Second Plan soon met its 4 nemesis'. 
6 
My present argument aims at no appraisal of the- Indian 
planning experience. Nor does it seek to present Bhabatosh 
Datta's comments about political choices as being free from the 
technological bias of the Second Plan which betrayed scant 
respect for the need of structural changes. After all, it will 
be misleading to claim that-the techno-economic sphere did not 
enjoy an autonomous status in Datta's analysis as well. And 
its reference to the political dimension of planning was 
perfectly in accord with the liberal ideology of assimilating 
all classes to a political order based on parliamentary 
democracy. 
The guestion that was raised in Datta's conundrum was 
whether the precepts of the liberal ideology could be unproble-
matically applied to a country that had already passed through 
centuries of colonial rule and exploitation. The Economises of 
Industrialisation studied this course of history within what 
was largely a neo-classical economic framework. The problem 
however was that the structure of contemporary underdevelopment 
presented a specific reality which had no precedent in the 
historical experience of the already affluent capitalist 
countries. Under the circumstances a commitment to the liberal 
paradigm could only end up with, a plea for a moderate pace of 
changing the old order, marking-out those choices which were 
compatible with liberalism and those which were not. 
However, it was the Nehru-Mahalanobis approach which 
came to constitute the foundation of India's development stra-
tegy. It did not favour the idea of a moderate pace of growth. 
The public sector was given the assignment of building up a 
modern capital-intensive industrial sector. While the basic 
liberal ideology was not given up, it was tempered by an 
emphasis on the state as the pace-setter of economic growth. 
It was as if the familiar Lewis model was extended to include 
the state and its development bureaucracy among the principal 
5 actors in the 'modern' sector. 
But of course the usual logic of a Lewis type growth 
path is seriously retarded, when duality continues to increase 
through a long period of capital expansion. It appears that 
capitalist accumulation, though not insignificant, may not be 
associated with the kind of universalization assigned to it 
in economic thought of the classical, neo-classical and also 
marxist tradition. On the contrary, the experience is marked 
by the assimilation of about 30 per cent or so of the population 
into the realm of capitalism, the rest being abandoned to a 
vast peripheral wilderness. The magnitude of the problem is 
clear from the fact that a 30 per cent enclave in India's 
demographic space is only marginally exceeded by the total 
population of the U.S.A. or cf the U.S.S.R. 
This does not mean that capitalism is unable to 
consolidate its own sphere. This is reflected in the consequen-
ces of the promotion by the state •f basic industries and 
infrastructural facilities. A sizeable increase cf small and 
medium scale units in production and circulation has the effect 
of broadening the entrepreneurial base. Moreover, capital can 
effectively manoeuvre its command over the entire order by 
exploiting through various means the structural dualities and 
the innumerable social-existence forms of labour. But neither 
enclaved economic consolidation, nor the corresponding political 
power produces the necessary impact on income and employment 
generation to eliminate the extremes of poverty and dualism. 
This leads to a rather significant conclusion : 'India's 
development pattern has exacerbated the 'dualism' that was 
there at the start of the development process itself. This can 
prove fairly corrosive if it is left unchanged. However, 
/"and this is the crucial part of the statement^/ if i s n o t 
planning as such that has done it rather, it is the product of 
.lack, of appropriate planning'.^ 
Now, the immediate context of this comment is the 
current controversy between the supporters of more-scope-for-
the-free-market and the protagonists of the public sector. It 
is meaningful to step aside for a moment and regard the terms «f 
this debate from, as it were, the outside. Obviously then, 
despite the differences in their institutional positions, both 
sides derive their case from the traditional logic of capital 
relation and its dynamics. Further, this logic works upon a 
paradigm where the entire demographic mass of social actors has 
been homogenized by a conceptual reduction to che category of 
•'economic man'. It if only then that the subsequent analytical 
relations between population growth, capital accumulation, 
market expansion and occupational diversification are obtained. 
However, the Indian experience of growing duality 
reveals if anything an involution of the traditional dynamics 
of capital. No feasible amount of capital accumulation at the 
core appears to generate significant growth effects beyond the 
enclave that we have already indicated. Thus the kind of 
duality that persists and even grows in scale raises questions 
rot merely about the level of investment but also about the 
points of its control and diffusion over the whole country. 
Indeed, many of the attributes of what is knowingly. »r unknowingly 
accepted as the 'natural law' of capital seem to call for a 
reexamination. Adherence to the conventional categories and 
and analytical relations only compounds the •paqueness and 
intractability of our empirical findings about the economic 
life of our people. This has critical implications for our 
understanding of the relations between political economy, 
everyday material life, culture, exercise of power - -if" acts 
of protest. The rest of -this paper addresses some of the 
problems mf theory and practice corresponding to such patterns 
of duality. 
The main theoretical concern of Classical Political 
Economy was to explain the coherence of a generalized market 
economy and its dynamics of accumulation leading to what 
liberal Ideology identified as social progress. The laws of 
the competitive market ensured unhindered pursuit cf self-
interest on the part of every individual in civil society and 
at the same time, converted the results of such self-seeking 
actions into the good of all. All this was encapsulated in the 
secret of a self-regulating economy as the vital element of a 
society of perfect liberty. And, 'It is in conducting the 
affairs of civil society, that mankind find the exercise of 
their best talents, as well as the object of their best 7 
affections'. 
The content and perspective of political economy 
attributed a central significance to the economic dimension of 
human social being. Society was interpreted as the expression 
of economic self-interest which would work through the processes 
of competition to ensure optimal advance and harmony. The 
economic motive was thus endowed with positive sanctions which 
had no precedent in medieval history. The same logic also 
freed property and its social functions from the sway of extra-
economic considerations of political and religious significance. 
Thus emerged a new legitimacy, a structure of socio-economic 
relations which presented no constraints on individual aspi-
rations for enrichment and on the use of such riches. The 
10 
achievement of this new legitimacy was the hallmark of bourgeois 
civil society. The liberal view of history associated such 
changes with the antecedent circumstances of an industrial 
revolution. 
One can read in this logic the more serious implications 
of attributing primacy to the construct of 'economic man'. 
Firstly, the principal human drives are all supposed to 
motivate men for improvement in 'material' well-being. The 
second point, while taking the first as an indispensible 
presupposition, is of even more critical conseguence. In the 
specific European context, it was linked to what the Enlighten-
ment signified as everyman1s natural self-interest. Indeed, 
the role of the principle of self-interest in the social world 
was compared by Helvetius to that of the law of gravitation in 
o 
the physical world.'" This was significant because it abandoned 
the medieval faith in the ideal of absolute unselfishness or 
self-denial. 
True the medieval faith aid not produce a record of social 
practice which we can uphold today, nor was it able to justify 
the moral value of self-denial except by appeal to an after-
world. But the priority given by the Enlightenment to self-
interest posed an altogether new problem of reconciling science 
and philosophy. While the scientific outlook expected all 
results to follow from the natural causality of things, the 
philosopher's world-view had its own normative ideals to which 
9 
reality was supposed to correspond. The strains of such a 
dichotomy are evident in all social contract theories; it 
troubled the eighteenth century English moral philosophers 
who were the immediate predecessors of Adam Smith. 
But before we consider the solution provided by Adam 
Smith, we should note a crucial difference which is overlooked 
11aAj L ^ A A - ^ d K o ^ M J ^ c J V 
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^ by Schumpeter in his assumption of continuity between natural 
10 
law theory and utilitarianism. In Schumpeter's view, the 
common good or social expediency of scholastic doctors was 
harnessed into a shape by the eighteenth century protagonists 
of reason. But while serving the emancipation of the individual. 
"Ti^ ncii n-inn ir As in traditional morality, the natural lav; 
theory still needed to refer to a norm of community. This is 
where utilitarian philosophy marked a sharp departure in its 
ideas of a serially constituted collective and in its reduction 
of all norms to an empirical criterion of the greatest happiness 11 of the greatest number. 
Returning then to the second point in relation to the 
construct of 'economic man', its significance was fully arti-
culated in the Wealth of Nations where Smith resolved the 
dichotomy by assigning to competition the role of the efficient 
link between 'private vices' and 'public benefits'. Smith's 
reconcilation avoided the extreme paradoxes of Mandeville. 
Smith needed no proposition such as 'man is not naturally 
sociable, but only teachable'. Nor was it necessary to show 
concern at the element of hypocrisy in such teaching. Thus, 
in Smith's ethos of political economy, universal selfishness 
could sustain society on the basis of 'utility, or justice, a 
"mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed 
12 valuation", etc.1 
This is the essence of Smith's vital proposition that the 
general good is best served by letting each individual pursue 
his own self-interest in the ordinary business of life. An 
essential consequence follows that ambition, the lust for power, 
and then desire for respect can all be satisfied by economic 
improvement. Smith is thus able to undercut the idea that 
passion can be set against passion, or the interests against 
13 passions. The premium on economic goals brought interests and 
12 
passions to a complementary relationship. 
Further, Smith was analysing a scheme of things in which 
accumulation and economic growth were essential for the best 
social performance. The uninhibited working of self-interest 
through the design of the competitive market assured the best 
results in this sphere as well. In Smith's own words : 
It is thus that the private interests and passions 
of individuals naturally dispose them to turn their 
stock towards the employments which in ordinary-
cases are most advantageous to the society. But if 
from this natural preference they should turn too 
much of it towards those employments, the fall of 
profit in them and the rise of it in all others 
immediately dispose them to alter the faulty distri-
bution. Without any intervention of law, therefore, 
the private interests and passions of men naturally 
lead them to divide and distribute the stock of 
every society among all the different employments 
carried on in it as nearly as possible in the propor-
tion which is most agreeable to the interest of the 
whole socicty.-4 
Adam Smith provides the paradigm with a mechanism in 
which the centrifugal force of self-interest is perfectly 
balanced by the gravity of competition. The assumptions and 
their level of abstraction categorise every human activity in 
terms of its place and circulation in the system of market 
relations. What cannot be directly conceived in such a manner 
may either be ignored or construed to be derivable from the 
economic situation and its gains and losses of exchange. The 
propensity to exchange is formulated as the mainspring of human 
social living. There emerges the centrality of 'economic man'. 
The same ideas were reflected in what was offered as the 
economic interpretation of history. It was built out of several 
propositions which regarded social change as dependent on 
economic development, affirming men to be self-regarding in 
all their activity, and indicated a four-stage scheme of 
15 
hunting, pasturage, farming and commerce. The nature and 
movement of the earlier stages of society were increasingly 
conceived in terms of economic categories appropriate to 
capitalism. There developed a bias of historiography of 
projecting back the crucial categories of capital and commc-16 dity exchange into the earlier stages. 
All this tended to suggest a validation of capitalism 
as an eternal motif of human history. It demonstrated the 
struggle of liberal ideology to combine its political economy 
with a techno-economic interpretation of historical progress. 
The position gained strength from the belief that social 
progress through economic development was inseparably associated 
with the dynamics of capital accumulation. The invariable 
emphasis on what capital does for soc ia 1 progress is evident 
from the common points in Smith's idea of a harmonious path 
to the advanced stationery state, Ricarao's premonition about 
obstacles to growth, and the 'hitchless' scheme of J.S. Mill's 
17 
vision of progress to a state free from extreme 'bustle'. 
Marx's critique of political economy emphasized those tenden-
cies which did not confirm the permanence of capitalism in 
history. However, his famous 'preface' giving an overview of 
historical stages is often misconstrued as an apologia for the 
'historical task' or even the 'privilege' of capitalist 
society to create sufficient conditions for socialism. Again, 
the Keynesian emphasis on the level of aggregate expenditure, 
and not on its direction, can do without the faith in laissez 
faire in order to revitalize the generative role of capital 
through state aid and participation. 
14 i — 
III 
The dynamic thrust of capitalism crystallized a 
historical perspective that all the world would some day become 
Europe. It signified the emergence and consolidation of the 
European nation-states, and also promised the achievement of 
universal hegemony of capital over the whole world. The task 
of achieving capital's universal hegemony is associated in 
more recent experience with an increasing tendency towards 
supernational combinations both in the spheres of circulation 
and production. Such tendencies reveal newer complexities of 
capital's survival in the contemporary world and, while 
ensuring its continental or even international security, they 
produce adverse effects on the capacity of national capital to 
genera^ sufficient growth motive within today's developing 
countries. In actual practice of course, the European 
experience itself was far from uniform. For the non-European 
world, the process of capitalist conguest and colonial domina-
tion almost inevitably created hybrid structures where 
capitalist and pre-capitalist fcrms remained mixed up. The 
point about the world becoming Europe was reduced to Europe's 
thriving on its imperialist supremacy over the world.. 
The hybrid socio-economic formations have had a lasting 
effect on indigenous capital accumulation and social change in 
countries which were colonies of Europe. This has extremely 
serious implications for the kind of ruling power which grows 
out of an amalgam of capital end pre-capital. Labour forms and 
modes of exploitation are not necessarily clarified in terms of 
a new capital-labour relation. Further, the ambiguities of 
commercialization produce many victims who are unable to 
comprehend what is being lost and what is being grafted in 
I 
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the process. Trade, capital and commodity production are mixed 
up in losses and gains which bring about the most violent up-
heavels in the ordinary business of human living. Yet, the 
vast mass of the people who are affected by these turmoils can 
only struggle to fit this unprecedented historical experience 
with their old sense of coherence based on the ties of community. 
Such features characterize what economic literature 
usually defines as a dualistic economy. The growth path 
necessary to move out of duality is supposed to depend on 
unhindered capital expansion. I have noted earlier the bearing 
of this perspective on the strategy of Indian economic develop-
ment. The public sector is given the key role in an overall 
framework of mixed economic planning. 
There are two points on which the approach commits the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness, i.e. the error of neglecting 
the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is 
considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain (pre-selected) 
18 
categories of thought. In the first place, capital accumu-
lation is supposed to wield the strength of universality which 
was associated with it in the dynamics of classical political 
economy. The analysis then misses several elements of the 
concrete historical situation which specifies the nature of 
duality. 
No assurance about the certrifugal impact of capital 
accumulation, about its cumulative linkages which would eliminate 
the precapitalist survivals, can be valid irrespective of actual 
historical circumstances. The expansion of capital works not 
only within the economic boundaries per se, but also in the 
social, political, demographic and cultural spheres. In fact 
if the historical perspective about capital accumulation leading 
to social progress has to have any basis at all, capital must 
have these effects outside the domain of the strictly economic. 
But the structure of duality itself precludes capital from 
fulfilling such a universalizing role. For an adequate 
understanding of the structure of duality, the economic process 
cannot foe considered in isolation from the rest of the system. 
Such a-sense of isolation marks the construct of 'economic man1. 
The same bias is evident in the kind of Marxist analysis 
which tends to reduce the rise and collapse of capitalism in 
history to a determination by economics alone. This kind of 
interpretation follows from a simplified and mechanistic 
understanding of concepts like the 'bourgeois revolution' and 
. — 1 9 
-irtsprogressive potential. Such a view neglects Marx's 
reflections on the complex contradictions of capitalism both 
in its development and lack of develooment. It was a vital 
component of Marx's thought that capitalism could sustain, 
strengthen and even create oppressive pre-capitalist forms on 
its peripheries. Again, during the last decade of his life, 
Marx was intensely concerned over the capacity of some pre-
capitalist collective forms for advancing the emancipation of 
labour. This was the context in which he started a serious 
endeavour to comprehend pre-capitalist societies in their own 2 0 ' terms. 
The second point of misplaced concreteness relates to 
the assumptions about the subjects of duality, who are to be 
remoulded by the centrifugal effects of capital accumulation. 
According to the classical argument, everyone is supposed to 
occupy a social situation in which the desire for economic 
gains and avoidance of losses will have similar results. The 
individual positions are different. But they are all monitored 
by a belief in formal equality. Although the subjects are tied 
1 1 
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to various forms of earnings and accruals, their response to 
gains and losses is exactly that of a regular wage earner. By 
and large they behave in accordancc with instrumental reasoning 
and utilitarian calculation. But a proper understanding of 
duality must begin with the perception that large masses of 
people in a given country do not yet fit the construct of 
'economic man'. 
Given duality, those in the backwoods of the dual 
structure cannot secure a place economic analysis as actors 
who act on their own tenms - terms which are different from 
those of the 'economic man1. The very fact of duality implies 
simultaneous articulation of both capitalism and pro-capitalism. 
No understanding in terms of homogeneous market categories 
alone will then be adeguate. For the vast multitude, production 
is not just a means to more advantageous exchange. Consequently, 
a uniform cognitive map of utilitarian culture will necessarily 
leave out the strivings and frustrations of the numerous. It 
is really a confusion in which each element mechanically presumes 
the other with no meaningful reflection on either the totality 
or on its parts. 
Further, 'The basis on which any collective unity is 
founded, the justifying principle, the sense of right or 
grievance, is a collective product. It is not entirely 
appropriate to judge such a product by the same criteria one 
uses to evaluate the theories and reasonings of individuals. 
The demands or strategies of a large group may appear at first 
glance ill-conceived or misguided. But almost always, they 
turn out to be rooted in the circumstances and experiences of 
the community? they generally prove to be a guide to its point 
on everyday practice; often they leave unmistakable traces of 
21 the work that was done to make a collective consciousness. 
1 8 i — 
This is how the political dimension of a dual economy 
like that we experience in India becomes more complex. No 
clarified capital relation integrates the entire toiling 
people into one distinct mode of production. At the same time, 
the provisions of older communities are destroyed by the 
predatory exploits of the market and capital. But the tradition 
of immediate collective loyalty at the grassroots survives the 
material decline of communities. Indeed, such alignments of 
local bondage remain vulnerable to cooption within an overarching 
command of capitalism. Yet in its dialectical thrust for 
negation, the sense of community among the toiling people also 
projects a challenge to the capitalist order. And so the 
politics of opposition in a dual economy need not be confined 
to subjects with clear positions in a civil society. 
All this is lost in the misplaced concreteness of the 
'economic man' waiting only to be assimilated to capital's 
quest for 'modernization'. Not that capital ever succeeds in 
accomplishing its project. The ambiguities of its genesis 
cast a shadow on the entire course of its evolution. Moreover, 
in Indian circumstances, capitalism grows in a demographic 
space where large parts of the oeople are never brought under 
the direct domain of capital-labour relation. But for the 
simplistic and reactionary premonition of Malthus, classical 
political economy had no particular ideas about the fate of 
its magnificent dynamics amidst such demographic spaces. 
It may be argued that the use of abstraction is 
unavoidable if one is to identify regular patterns in any 
complex of social interaction. Further, the science of 
economics is no longer confined to the classical world of 
'natural laws'. No less important is the availability today 
of numerous toolboxes which embellish economic analysis. Still 
the protlem of misplaced concreteness remains. Economic science 
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now talks of 'economic men' who are avid strategic bargainers 
and innovative profit-seekers. For example, the model of 
attaining the best possible social situation through the route 
of cooperative games is posed as Edgeworth's counterposition of 
Walras. However, the very concept of coalition in the coopera-
tive model is moulded by individualistic priority of utilitarian 
consideration. Thus the cultural matrix is assumed to be frozen 
in terms of the ethos and ethics of the bourgeois order. The 
error lies in an invalid extension of the presupposition which 
marked the historical origin of the specific discipline. It is 
then utterly misleading to raise the discipline to the status 
of a universal science on the strength of the toolbox. The box 
itself continues to remain subject to the bindings of its epoch 
of origin. For dualistic structures, much is forgone in the 
failure to admit other premises of human action in the ordinary-
business of life. 
There are numerous examples to indicate how such limita-
tions constrain our arguments for planned economic development. 
They do not necessarily betray unconcern for the diversities of 
social and cultural being. However, the essence of the bourgeois 
paradigm is clear from one particular_emphasis of most planning 
exercises. The central problem is inevitably posed as one of 
choice between commodity vectors which are more or less conducive 
to economic growth. It appears as if plan making can proceed 
according to choice-functions relating only to the commodity 
vectors. And at this level of abstraction, a society is endowed 
with a freedom of choice between commodity vectors. 
In his presentation of the elaborate argument for the 
Second Plan, Mahalanobis mentioned five factors which might limit 
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the planning process envisaged by him. The issues related to 
the production of enough goods in the small and household 
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industries, the rate of expansion of the basic industries, the 
lack of trained personnel and the mobilisation of adequate 
financial resources. Finally, it was mentioned that the plan's 
work would be difficult or even impossible if there were 
rigidities in the system of administration. 
i . 
Thus, the logical consistency of the plan-frame was not 
a sufficient guarantee of its feasibility in practice. However, 
"so far as plan-making is concerned (as distinguished from plan 
implementation) all that can be demanded is internal consistency, 
valid technical reasoning and correct appreciation of social 
2 3 -needs'. The distinction between plan making and its implemen-
..tation is curious. The very idea of a plan being logically 
consistent is illogical unless the same plan can provide the 
ways and means of its own implementation. No economic innovation 
can be considered logical as a mere exercise in logic. It has 
to be linked up with the coherence of human social engagement 
necessary for the innovation. 
The question- of: the financial obstacle is inseparable 
from the prevailing structure' of assets and distribution of 
claims. With 50 per cent of the1 planned outlay left to completely 
uncertain sources, the Second'Plan's problem of financial 
resources assumed critical dimensions. The production plan had 
few clues about the ways and means of resource mobilisation. 
The plan had no command of itself. Nor could it proceed to work 
by virtue of the logical principles supposed to have been built 
into its content. We can- hardly commend the logic of a production 
plan which is silent about human agencies to work it out. 
It is here that we observe a critical estrangement of the 
plan from its ground. Significantly then, the category of 
administration stipulates a set of needs which pertain to all 
the limiting factors, and in its range of contingencies, to the 
entire working of the plan. We are told that 'there must be 
thorough decentralization of administrative and financial powers 
in the case of public enterprises and institutions, and also 
active cooperation between official and non-official agencies ' , 
Correlatively, the critical human terms of the plan are subsumed 
in the so-called rationale of administration. Probably, it is 
not by chance that Mahalanobis says 'administration' rather than 
'social direction in the midst of class conflicts', 'decentrali-
zation' rather than 'popular initiative1, and 'official and non-
official' rather than 'mass leadership and collective effort'. 
The plan evolves its targets in simulation of the 
'economic man' who selects the commodity vector compatible with 
maximum economic growth. All this is reduced to matters of 
techno-physical consistency of things and their production. We 
have noted the need to specify human agencies for accomplishing 
the targets laid in the commodity vectors and capital-output 
ratios. The_pian looks around only to find administration as 
the deus ex machina which can be held responsible either for the 
success or for the failure of what is to be done. 
This kind of economic planning sets its boundaries in 
the first instance. The clarity of a model has to evade many 
facts of the wider social space. The emphasis on administration 
is again a case of misplaced concreteness. What is even worse, 
such a distortion of the invocative and constitutive uses of 
economic policy carries with it the potential for adroit state 
manoeuvres to serve the existing privileges of power and 
exploitation. 
We have the example of a subsequent analysis which 
mentions that the inadeguacy of public investment follows from 
the nature of appropriation by the three dominant proprietary 
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classes (viz. industrial capitalists, rich farmers and both civil 
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and military professionals) in the Indian economy and polity. 
As regards the remedies however, Bardhan1 s emphasis on the need, 
to promote larger investment is not linked to the politico-
economic issues of persistent duality in spite of sizeable 
increases in the overall rates of investment. Thus, although 
Bardhan deals with the questions of proprietary classes and the 
role of the state in conflict management, he betrays no concern 
for the problem of involution of capital dynamics in dualistic 
structures. 
A recent retrospect of India's planning experience 
rightly points out the ineptitude of projecting consistency at 
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a level of aggregation that may not work in practice. It is 
then necessary to clarify the sense of the concrete which can 
replace the invalid aggregates. This however is a point which 
Chakravarty does not pursue to any sufficient extent. His 
approach to the economic issues has its own internal coherence 
and does not miss the fact of increasing duality through the 
period of planned economic development. There is a clear 
admission of the importance of socio-nistorical processes and 
their irreversibilities. But in reflecting on the need for 
political consensus Chakravarty recalls the first decade of 27 planning as one of some exemplary achievement. 
Thus, the role of political consensus is abstracted from 
its content for the multitude. We are back to the problem of 
inept aggregation. No understanding can be adequate without 
proper accounting of capital dynamics in this context. The 
issues are germane to what Chakravarty reckons elsewhere as two 
2 R 
of Marx's critical insights. Wealth has to be realized as 
'power' and not merely as an aid to future gratification. 
Further, capitalism wields the dynamics of power largely through 
the extraction of 'labour' out of labour power. 
1 
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The point one has to emphasize in respect of dualistic 
structures is this ; the 'power' of capital becomes dominant, 
while its dynamics do not necessarily articulate in one 
characteristic social-existence form of labour. Both the 
foregoing Marxian propositions work, but in imperfect corres-
pondence. The social process is not transparent purely as 
articulation of capitalism. It falls short of the properties 
associated with capitalism in history, particularly of its 
techno-physical content of economic growth. I have noted 
already the power implications of such an amalgam of labour forms 
and modes of extraction. 
The case is not one of failed capitalism which can 
later succeed with the aid of a pace-setting public sector. How 
can we then have answers to the critical questions about eronomic 
development? Certainly not in the political consensus of the 
first decade of Indian planning. Indeed, the growth of duality 
was no less true of the manoeuvres of that political consensus. 
It is not clear how the oppressed will situate the oppressors in 
the structure of political consensus desired by Chakravarty. 
This is how he tells us of ,the experience, but misses its full 
meaning. All our solutions are then enclosed by the boundaries 
of the 'economic man'. For the multitude however, the main task 
consists in overcoming the trap laid by this construct in order 
to achieve their own consciousness and power. 
We may recall the choices posed in The Economics of 
Industrialization. In a significant sense, the whole of our 
planning experience bears out the relevance of what was implicit^ 
formulated in that early analysis of underdevelopment. While 
restricting his own discourse to strictly economic terms, Datta 
mentioned that a political choice was unavoidable for achieving 
quick economic growth along with a reduction of inequality and 
a high internal saving ratio. Indeed, the problem of reconciling 
the four objectives took us to the fringes of the economic 
boundaries. Datta was not the ideologue to advocate a crossing 
of frontiers. But a sight of the liminal was meaningful. It 
could signify the need which was there to take economic analysis 
beyond its conventional limits. 
Needless to say, our critigue of the limits of 'economic 
man' is closely linked to the repercussions of the fact that no 
process of universalization of European capitalism has arti-
culated itself in real history*. This phenomenon is clear from 
the experience of Indian planning. No elimination of duality 
has materialized through the agency of the 'economic man' alone 
either on its atomistic ground, or in a composite aggregate 
expression which the public sector is supposed to present. 
A large majority of the subjects of social activity do 
not measure the world according to the premises of the 'economic 
man'. Nor do the categories of our economic science have an 
adeguate understanding of what they figure out for themselves. 
Those subjects bear the lasting effects of a history which left 
them incapable of confronting the forced inception of capitalism 
• .i.: < - t 
on its terms. For them, the mixture of the economic and the 
non-economic elements are still too dense to permit the 
abstraction of 'economic man' monitored by the 'natural laws' 
of market exchange and capital accumulation. Perhaps they can 
regard that issues of economic well-being should be considered 
outside the logic of the capital relation and its dynamics. 
This involves not only the 
proprietary guestion, but also the 
techno-physical content of capital and the assumptions about 
its centrifugal transmission through wider social spaces. 
All this must not be understood as a mere insistence on 
community and moral values. History has left no room for a 
simple restoration of an older order. Moreover, we already 
have enough experience of hov; such traditional biases can be 
accommodated within an ambiguous bourgeois order. Neither 
Datta1s posure of political democracy, nor Chakravarty1s desire 
for a larger political consensus can evade the issue that formal 
consent to a political order does not necessarily imply its 
active validation on the part of the multitude. Modern India 
has repeatedly confronted with such questions; more so in 
the last forty years after independence. We must not evade 
them because the answers call for a radical reconstruction of 
our theories. 
The writer is grateful to Sourin Bhattacharya, Partha Chatterjee 
and Rudrangshu Mukherjee for their useful comments on the first 
draft of this paper. 
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